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Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Thematic cluster I. Special and personal envoys, special advisers and personal representatives of the Secretary-General and Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2008 for six special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of special and personal envoys, special advisers and personal representatives of the Secretary-General and the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon.

The report does not include requirements for the Special Adviser for Africa owing to the completion of the mandate. The Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon has been appointed as the Special Coordinator for Lebanon and his Office renamed the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon.

The estimated requirements for 2008 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to $11,940,800.

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Financial overview

1. The estimated requirements for 2008 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to $11,940,800 (net) and requirements by mission are detailed in the table below. The report allows for a comparison between total requirements for 2008 compared to total requirements for 2007 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/252 and contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/61/525/Add.1) and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/61/640).

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2006-31 December 2007 variance			*Requirements for 2008*		*Variance analysis 2007-2008*	
Mission	*Appropriations*	*Estimated expenditures*	*Savings (deficit)*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Total requirements 2007*	*Variance*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)=(1)-(2)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)=(4)-(6)*
1. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar	220.9	218.4	2.5	781.9	19.3	198.4	583.5
2. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus	424.2	52.1	372.1	298.5	—	399.6	(101.1)
3. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities	1 722.6	1 299.5	423.1	1 902.9	49.0	1 082.5	820.4
4. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	635.7	623.2	12.5	867.4	—	352.8	514.6
5. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	1 754.8	1 135.3	619.5	931.0	—	1 091.7	(160.7)
6. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	4 284.1	4 830.7	(546.6)	7 159.1	929.2	3 084.2	4 074.9
Total requirements	**9 042.3**	**8 159.2**	**883.1**	**11 940.8**	**997.5**	**6 209.2**	**5 731.6**

1. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar

($781,900)

Background, mandate and objective

2. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar was appointed in accordance with the mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly, most recently, in its resolution 61/232, to continue to provide his good offices and to pursue his discussions on the situation of human rights and the restoration of democracy with the Government and the people of Myanmar, including all relevant parties to the national reconciliation process in Myanmar, and to offer technical assistance to the Government in this regard.

3. Since his appointment in April 2000, the Special Envoy for Myanmar has visited Myanmar several times in connection with the good offices role of the Secretary-General and played a catalytic role in the confidential confidence-building talks between the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from 2000 to 2003 as well as in the national reconciliation process in that country. National reconciliation in Myanmar is by its nature a "home-grown" process and the roles of the Secretary-General and the Special Envoy under the good offices mandate given by the General Assembly are primarily to facilitate that process.

4. In order to help revitalize the process, the Special Envoy visited Myanmar from 1 to 4 March 2004. As a result of the facilitation efforts by the Special Envoy, the National League for Democracy was allowed to reopen its headquarters in Yangon, although its regional offices across the country remain closed. The Government-sponsored National Convention was reconvened briefly in May 2004, in February 2005 and again in December 2005 for about two months, without the participation of the National League for Democracy and some ethnic nationality political parties. Owing to the political stalemate on the ground, the Special Envoy was not allowed to return since March 2004 and he resigned from his position in January 2006.

5. After two years without high-level dialogue between the United Nations and Myanmar, the then Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs visited Myanmar twice, in May and November 2006, in the context of the Secretary-General's good offices mandate and at the invitation of the Government. On both occasions, the Special Envoy met with the senior leadership and Government counterparts, and with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. As a result of these visits, the Government has made some tentative progress on certain issues, including, for example, the release of some political prisoners in January 2007 and an agreement with the International Labour Organization on a mechanism to address forced labour complaints in February 2007, while other issues remain outstanding. Furthermore, the Government of Myanmar has since invited other senior United Nations officials to visit Myanmar in connection with their respective mandates.

6. On 22 May 2007, the Secretary-General designated his Special Adviser for the International Compact with Iraq and Other Political Issues to serve as his Special Envoy to continue to pursue the good offices mandate given by the General Assembly.

7. In implementing the mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly, the Special Envoy and the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat cooperate and collaborate closely with the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team. There has been increasing

awareness of and concern about the operational environment for in-country activities in the economic and social areas. It has become established practice for the Special Envoy to meet with members of the country team when he visits Myanmar and for the United Nations Resident Coordinator and other members of the team to meet regularly with representatives of the Department of Political Affairs when they visit Headquarters. The Special Envoy also consults with relevant United Nations officials and entities to ensure coordinated engagement by various parts of the United Nations system in Myanmar.

8. The Secretary-General remains committed to providing his good offices and to pursuing discussions with the Government and the people of Myanmar on the situation of human rights, the national reconciliation process and the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. During recent visits to Myanmar and the broader region, including India, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, to consult with Myanmar's regional and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbours, the designated Special Envoy was engaged in developing a greater consensus on the approach towards Myanmar and will before the end of the year also need to consult with other ASEAN members and other key actors to ensure a broad-based approach to his good offices mandate.

9. The good offices efforts of the Secretary-General would no longer be required when national reconciliation and democratization in Myanmar are achieved based on the participation of all the parties concerned and in accordance with a series of General Assembly resolutions. Until that objective is achieved, it is anticipated that the Assembly, during its sixty-second session, will extend the mandate of the Secretary-General to continue to pursue his good offices role to facilitate the process.

10. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Envoy are presented below.

Objective: To facilitate the national reconciliation and democratization process in Myanmar.

Expected accomplishments	**Indicators of achievement**
(a) Restoration of the freedom of movement of political and other leaders	(a) Release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her deputy from house arrest and release of other political prisoners
	Performance measures
	2006: No information available
	Estimate 2007: 2,000
	Target 2008: Most, if not all, of the political prisoners are released from prison
(b) Restoration of political activities	(b) (i) Reopening of the offices of the National League for Democracy throughout the country

Performance measures

2006: No information available

Estimate 2007: 5

Target 2008: Most, if not all, of the offices are reopened

(ii) Resumption of dialogue among the Government, National League for Democracy and ethnic nationalities on ways to advance the country's democratic transition

Performance measures

2006: No information available

Estimate 2007: 1 meeting between the National League for Democracy and the Government

Target 2008: More regular consultations between the Government, the National League for Democracy and other groups

Outputs

- Continued discussions with the Myanmar authorities and other relevant parties on the national reconciliation process
- Continued discussions and consultations with the key interested Member States, including countries in the region
- Statements of the Secretary-General on the situation in Myanmar
- Reports of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and other briefings, as requested

External factors

11. The good offices role of the Secretary-General, carried out largely through the Special Envoy, is expected to achieve its objective provided that the Government of Myanmar, the National League for Democracy and ethnic nationality groups are willing and committed to reach a political solution and that the international community, especially the countries of the region, provide support for the Secretary-General's efforts.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2006-31 December 2007 variance			Requirements for 2008		Variance analysis 2007-2008	
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Savings (deficit)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Total requirements 2007	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	100.9	—	100.9	493.5	—	100.9	392.6
Operational costs	120.0	218.4	(100.6)	288.4	19.3	97.5	190.9
Total requirements	**220.9**	**218.4**	**2.5**	**781.9**	**19.3**	**198.4**	**583.5**

12. The estimated requirements for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar for a one-year period ending 31 December 2008 amount to $781,900 net ($865,100 gross) and would provide for civilian personnel costs pertaining to the Special Envoy at the Under-Secretary-General level for nine months and his support staff (1 P-4, 1 General Service (Other level)) for a 12-month period, operational costs ($288,400) comprising consultants ($43,900), official travel ($214,900), facilities and infrastructure ($13,300), communications ($4,300) and information technology ($6,000), as well as miscellaneous supplies and services ($6,000).

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above								General Service and related category			National staff			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field/ Security Service	General Service	Total international	National Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Grand total
Approved 2007	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	2
Proposed 2008	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	1	3	—	—	—	3
Change	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	2	—	(1)	—	1

13. As a result of the proposed establishment of the Office in New York and the political developments in Myanmar, it is proposed to increase the existing staffing establishment by a Special Assistant (P-4) position and to convert the Administrative Assistant position from the Local level to the General Service (Other level).

2. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus

($298,500)

Background, mandate and objective

14. The question of Cyprus has been on the agenda of the Security Council for over 40 years. It is one of the oldest items continuously addressed by the Secretary-General through his good offices. The latest efforts towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem began eight years ago when, by its resolution

1250 (1999), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to invite the leaders of the two sides to negotiations in the autumn of 1999. Proximity talks were held from December 1999 to November 2000 and direct talks from January 2002 to February 2003. Following a stalemate in the talks, the Secretary-General in March 2003 announced that the process begun in December 1999 had reached an end. A renewed effort commenced on 13 February 2004 and ended when the proposed Foundation Agreement on the "Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem" was submitted to separate simultaneous referendums on 24 April 2004. The Agreement was rejected by the Greek Cypriot electorate by a margin of three to one and approved by the Turkish Cypriot electorate by a margin of two to one. It therefore did not enter into force, thus resulting in a divided Cyprus entering the European Union on 1 May 2004.

15. The outcome of the referendums resulted in a two-year stalemate between the two sides. In January 2006, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative and Head of Mission for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, who, in the absence of a Special Adviser, assumed the function as a high-level point of contact on the ground for the two sides.

16. From 3 to 9 July 2006, the Secretary-General dispatched the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to assess the political situation in and around Cyprus and the prospects of a full resumption of his good offices. On 8 July, the Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, met in his presence and agreed on a set of principles and decisions (see S/2006/572). Under the terms of the agreement, the two leaders recognized that the status quo was unacceptable and that a comprehensive settlement was both desirable and possible. They decided to begin immediately a two-track process, involving bicommunal discussions by technical committees of issues affecting the day-to-day life of the people and, concurrently, consideration by expert working groups of substantive issues, both of which "will contribute to a comprehensive settlement". The two leaders also agreed to "meet further, from time to time, as appropriate", to give directions to the working groups and review the work of the technical committees.

17. The Secretary-General subsequently approved the Under-Secretary-General's recommendation to appoint a new Special Adviser in the event that an understanding was reached on a list of substantive issues to be discussed and real progress achieved in the work of the technical committees and the working groups.

18. Since the signing of the 8 July agreement, the two sides have been engaged in a sustained dialogue, facilitated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, aimed at implementing the agreement. A Coordination Committee (comprising advisers of the two leaders and the Special Representative) met 21 times in 2006 and 16 times (as of 22 June) in 2007, and a number of bilateral meetings between the Special Representative and each side have been convened. The main objective of the Coordination Committee has been to agree on the modalities for the launching of the working groups and technical committees.

19. On 15 November 2006, in the light of differences that emerged between the two sides regarding the implementation of the 8 July agreement, the then Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs wrote to the two leaders, suggesting a way forward. Although both leaders responded positively on 18 November, implementation of the agreement has yet to start. There is broad consensus on the

way forward, including preliminary agreement on the list of issues for the technical committees and the working groups. However, differences remain concerning the interpretation of the agreement, most notably on what constitutes a day-to-day matter, and the mechanism for resolving disagreements.

20. In his report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/2007/328), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council about his contacts with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey and the Prime Minister of Turkey in February and March, who confirmed their support in seeking a lasting solution under the auspices of the Secretary-General's good offices mission. He also reported that although, in early April, the Turkish Cypriot leader had shared with him his misgivings about the direction in which the process appeared to be moving, his adviser had assured the Special Representative and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs of the continuing commitment of the Turkish Cypriot side to the 8 July agreement process. The Greek Cypriot side had also reconfirmed its commitment to the process.

21. The Security Council has made repeated calls for the 8 July agreement to be implemented. By its resolution 1728 (2006), the Council expressed full support for the process agreed upon by the leaders and called for early completion of the preparatory phase so that a fully fledged good offices process may resume as soon as possible. On 27 March 2007, in a statement to the press, the members of the Council urged both communities to work with the United Nations to implement the 8 July agreement, in particular through the immediate creation of bicommunal working groups and technical committees, in order to prepare the ground for full-fledged negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement. Most recently, the Council, by its resolution 1758 (2007) once again expressed full support for the 8 July process and called upon all parties to immediately engage constructively with the United Nations efforts and to demonstrate measurable progress in order to allow fully fledged negotiations to begin.

22. Both the Secretary-General and the Security Council have underlined that the responsibility of finding a solution lies first and foremost with the Cypriots themselves. In that connection, civil society has been encouraged to be more actively engaged in the search for a comprehensive settlement. At the same time, the Council, in its aforementioned resolution, noted the primary role of the United Nations in assisting the parties to bring the Cyprus conflict and division of the island to a comprehensive and durable settlement.

23. Depending on the developments on the island, in 2008, the Secretary-General may decide to appoint a Special Adviser to carry out his good offices mission at the shortest possible notice to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. In this connection, it should be noted that, for the first time since July 2006, Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr. Talat met on 5 September 2007 and agreed to continue their contacts through the United Nations and to meet again when appropriate.

24. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

Objective: To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
(a) Progress towards the implementation of the 8 July 2006 agreement through increased dialogue	(a) (i) Increased number of meetings between the two leaders *Performance measures* 2006: 2 meetings Estimate 2007: 2 meetings Target 2008: 6 meetings (ii) Increased dialogue between the two sides within the framework of the Coordination Committee *Performance measures* 2006: 21 meetings Estimate 2007: 30 meetings Target 2008: 35 meetings (iii) Establishment of technical committees and working groups *Performance measures* 2006: 0 committees and working groups Estimate 2007: 0 committees and working groups Target 2008: 12 committees and working groups (iv) Active engagement of civil society in both communities in the search for a comprehensive settlement *Performance measures* Number of conferences, seminars and other relevant events organized by civil society organizations engaged in the search for a comprehensive settlement 2006: 59 Estimate 2007: 120 Target 2008: 150

(b) Restoration of full-fledged negotiations to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem	(b) Number of substantive issues agreed as the basis for a comprehensive settlement *Performance measures* 2006: 0 issues Estimate 2007: 0 issues Target 2008: 4 issues

Outputs

- Consultations with interested parties
- Facilitation of dialogue and negotiations between the two sides, including the two leaders
- Advisory services to civil society organizations on their engagement in the search for a comprehensive settlement
- Advisory services on procedural, legal and technical aspects of substantive issues
- Working papers and proposals serving as the basis for a comprehensive settlement
- Reports to and briefings of the Security Council

External factors

25. It is expected that the objective can be achieved provided that there is political will and commitment on the part of the two sides to reach a comprehensive settlement, as well as continuing support from the international community.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2006-31 December 2007 variance			*Requirements for 2008*		*Variance analysis 2007-2008*	
Category of expenditure	*Appropriations*	*Estimated expenditures*	*Savings (deficit)*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Total requirements 2007*	*Variance*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)=(1)-(2)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)=(4)-(6)*
Civilian personnel costs	274.4	—	274.4	173.1	—	274.4	(101.3)
Operational costs	149.8	52.1	97.7	125.4	—	125.2	0.2
Total requirements	**424.2**	**52.1**	**372.1**	**298.5**	**—**	**399.6**	**(101.1)**

26. In anticipation of the appointment of a Special Adviser in 2008, the estimated requirements amounting to $298,500 net ($333,100 gross) would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the Special Adviser and his or her support staff ($173,100), official travel ($124,900) and other supplies and services ($500).

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related category*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field/ Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Grand total***
Approved 2007	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**2**	—	1	**3**	—	—	—	**3**
Proposed 2008	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**2**	—	1	**3**	—	—	—	**3**
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

27. The total staffing requirements for the Office for 2008 will remain unchanged.

3. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities

($1,902,900)

Background, mandate and objective

28. Following the Security Council's invitation to the Secretary-General, in its resolution 1366 (2001), to refer to the Council information and analyses from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Secretary-General, in his letter dated 12 July 2004 (S/2004/567), informed the President of the Council of his decision to appoint Juan Méndez as his Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. In his reply of 13 July 2004 (S/2004/568), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's decision.

29. According to the outline of the mandate contained in the annex to the aforementioned letter of the Secretary-General, the Special Adviser's responsibilities are the following: (a) to collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; (b) to act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention potential situations that could result in genocide; (c) to make recommendations to the Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt genocide; and (d) to liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage information related to genocide or related crimes.

30. At the end of May 2007, the Secretary-General appointed his new Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Francis Deng, in a continuing effort to strengthen the United Nations role in this area.

31. To complement the work of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, to operationalize the concept and to develop the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, as elaborated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome and contained in paragraphs 138 to 140 of General Assembly resolution 60/1, the

Secretary-General decided to appoint a Special Adviser for the Responsibility to Protect at the Assistant Secretary-General level. The Special Adviser will work closely with the Secretary-General and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities to advance and consolidate the 2005 World Summit consensus on the responsibility to protect and provide advice and recommendations as may be required. In addition, the Special Adviser will: (a) consult with Member States on ways in which the United Nations could help realize the norms and goals articulated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome; (b) engage other parts of the Secretariat and the United Nations system as well as other actors from around the world in an assessment of ways in which the United Nations system, other global and regional institutions, and the larger international community could assist the implementation of the responsibility to protect; (c) serve as a focal point in promoting this norm; (d) draw on the results of these consultations, discussions and assessments to advise the Secretary-General on how the United Nations could best forward and support these objectives; and (e) assist the Secretary-General in carrying out his decisions in this area, as needed.

32. During 2007, the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities continued to operate in close collaboration with the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and continued to deepen its exchanges and collaboration with the European Union and the African Union. Moreover, the Special Adviser participated in (a) the Executive Committee on Peace and Security and the Inter-Departmental Framework Team, providing participants with guidance on genocide prevention and requesting information relevant to his mandate, (b) discussions of the Policy Committee that had a bearing upon his mandate and (c) a number of interdepartmental task forces and working groups on issues of concern to the mandate, such as those on the peacekeeping operations in the Sudan (the United Nations Mission in the Sudan) and in Côte d'Ivoire (the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire). Furthermore, he maintained close contact with the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in the peacekeeping missions in Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the Sudan, and provided guidance on indicators for and the prevention of hate speech and incitement to the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat.

33. The Special Adviser has also maintained a system for the collection of information for early warning of genocide from within the United Nations system as well as from outside sources, relying on a list of warning signs intended to identify situations requiring his attention, on the basis of information and analyses available within the United Nations and external early warning mechanisms. The starting point for information collections is the legal definition of the crime of genocide and other punishable acts as established by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide[1] and to be of particular relevance for the Office, information must point towards the existence of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group at risk. In addition, violations of human rights and humanitarian law, which may become massive or serious, have to take place with additional factors

[1] General Assembly resolution 260 A (III), annex, articles 2 and 3.

deriving from the developing international case law on genocide and the findings of academic research in genocide studies. Precipitating or external factors serve to determine those situations which may warrant the Special Adviser's immediate attention and for which recommendations to the Secretary-General for action may also be warranted.

34. The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities participated in numerous public international and academic events, maintained contact with civil society organizations and non-governmental groups involved in early warning activities and contributed to the dissemination of information on genocide prevention through media events and opinion pieces placed with the assistance of the Department of Public Information. In addition, the Office provided logistical, administrative and substantive support to the Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention appointed by the Secretary-General on 3 May 2006 and comprising distinguished individuals with a diversity of backgrounds related to conflict prevention, human rights, peacekeeping, diplomacy and mediation.

35. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

Objective: To prevent massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of a national, ethnic, racial or religious character that could lead to genocide, to operationalize the norm and to develop the doctrine of the responsibility to protect.

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
(a) Greater understanding and awareness by State, non-State and regional actors of situations and conditions that could lead to genocide and mass atrocities	(a) (i) Increased number of new State, non-State and regional actors engaged in analysing indicators of massive and serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law of an ethnic, racial, national or religious character, including the development of possible mitigating factors *Performance measures* 2006: 10 actors Estimate 2007: 10 actors Target 2008: 15 actors (ii) Increased number of commissioned and publicly available studies on genocide, including effective measures to prevent situations that could lead to genocide and mass atrocities

	Performance measures 2006: Not available Estimate 2007: 2 studies Target 2008: 6 studies (iii) Increased number of requests for information on early warning indicators and/or methodology from Member States, civil society and United Nations departments and agencies *Performance measures* 2006: Not available Estimate 2007: 0 Target 2008: 4 requests for information
(b) Development of an improved early warning and prevention mechanism on actions to be taken to prevent genocide or mass atrocities	(b) Increased number of developed and implemented procedures and cooperative frameworks between the United Nations system and regional organizations to review and analyse situations and conditions that could lead to genocide or mass atrocities *Performance measures* 2006: Not available Estimate 2007: 1 procedure and cooperative framework Target 2008: 4 procedures and cooperative frameworks
(c) Increased understanding by Member States and other key actors of the concept of the responsibility to protect, and an enhanced capability by Member States to recognize early warning indicators and mitigate impacts	(c) Increased number of press and media articles on the concept of the responsibility to protect from increasingly diverse regions *Performance measures* 2006: Not available Estimate 2007: 0 Target 2008: 20 press and media articles

Outputs

- Advice to Member States through advisory missions, consultations and liaison activities on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities
- Conduct of interdisciplinary familiarization and confidence-building missions to regions of tension or conflict
- Early analysis of indicators for genocide and/or massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law of an ethnic, racial, national or religious nature
- Public advocacy campaign on preventive action in situations that could lead to genocide or mass atrocities, including the commissioning of studies, development of the website and outreach activities
- Joint consultations with Member States and participants of the United Nations system on the concept of the responsibility to protect, including key indicators and mitigating measures, such as legislative action on hate speech
- Regular meetings, seminars and workshops with civil society groups having an active interest in promoting the responsibility to protect and in acting as an early warning mechanism in various regions
- Regular and structured meetings with governmental experts, independent scholars, policy analysts and research centres to assess the means available to the United Nations system and regional organizations to assist in the implementation of the responsibility to protect
- Organization of four expert group meetings and two workshops on early warning signs of situations that could lead to genocide or mass atrocities
- Establishment and compilation of a roster of experts and further development of a system/database for information gathering and analysis
- Regular joint meetings with the Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities on the broader efforts of the United Nations to prevent genocide
- Reports to and briefings of the Security Council

External factors

36. The objective is expected to be achieved, provided that there is political will on the part of members of the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies to engage with the Special Advisers in order to consider and, as necessary, act upon their analysis and recommendations; that there is willingness among Member States that are host to critical events to allow access to and engage with the Special Advisers; and that there is goodwill and active involvement of regional and other organizations.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2006-31 December 2007 variance			Requirements for 2008		Variance analysis 2007-2008	
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Savings (deficit)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Total requirements 2007	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	1 091.1	954.0	137.1	1 279.3	—	714.1	565.2
Operational costs	631.5	345.5	286.0	623.6	49.0	368.4	255.2
Total requirements	**1 722.6**	**1 299.5**	**423.1**	**1 902.9**	**49.0**	**1 082.5**	**820.4**

37. The estimated requirements for the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Genocide and Mass Atrocities for a one-year period ending 31 December 2008 amount to $1,902,900 net ($2,126,600 gross) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of four existing positions as well as the establishment of four new positions (1 USG, 1 P-5, 1 P-3, 1 General Service (Other level)) ($1,279,300), consultancy services ($33,300) for developing thematic studies, official travel ($425,200), the acquisition of office equipment and rental of premises for the Office ($137,400), local transportation costs during advisory missions ($4,500), communications and information technology ($17,200) as well as for the organization of meetings of the Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide ($6,000).

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									General Service and related category			National staff			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field/ Security Service	General Service	Total inter-national	National Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Grand total
Approved 2007	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	3	—	1	4	—	—	—	4
Proposed 2008	1	1	—	—	1	2	1	—	6	—	2	8	—	—	—	8
Change	**1**	**—**	**—**	**—**	**1**	**—**	**1**	**—**	**3**	**—**	**1**	**4**	**—**	**—**	**—**	**4**

38. It is proposed to establish the position of the Special Adviser on Genocide and Mass Atrocities at the Under-Secretary-General level to emphasize the importance of his mandate and to ensure a more continuous high-level liaison with Member States, regional organizations, academic and non-governmental bodies and United Nations entities. The incumbent of the existing Assistant Secretary-General position would act as the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect and focus exclusively on the timely and effective development of the concept and mandate of the responsibility to protect. Furthermore, it is proposed to establish the position of a Special Assistant (P-5) to ensure effective coordination between the two Special Advisers, a Reporting Officer (P-3) and an additional Administrative Assistant (General Service (Other level)) to provide dedicated administrative support to each of the Special Advisers.

4. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

($867,400)

Background, mandate and objective

39. In his letter dated 25 July 2005 (S/2005/497), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his decision to appoint Ambassador Peter van Walsum of the Netherlands as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara and indicated that the Envoy would help the Secretary-General assess the situation and explore with the parties, neighbouring States and other stakeholders, how best to overcome the prevailing political impasse in the Western Saharan region. Following this communication, in a letter dated 28 July 2005 (S/2005/498), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the decision to appoint Ambassador van Walsum as his Personal Envoy had been brought to the attention of the members of the Council and that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's intention.

40. The Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General will continue to provide his good offices and to pursue efforts for a lasting solution for Western Sahara. Since his appointment, the Personal Envoy has established contacts with the parties concerned, with neighbouring States and with members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara to ascertain their views on the political situation and has assessed their position towards the various initiatives presented in past years.

41. Most recently, in its resolution 1754 (2007), the Security Council called upon the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions in good faith, taking into account the developments of the past few months, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution. It also requested the Secretary-General to set up the negotiations under his auspices and invited Member States to lend appropriate assistance to such talks.

42. Subsequently, the first meeting of the negotiating process started in June 2007. In order to reach a political solution on the question of Western Sahara, the Personal Envoy will continue to hold discussions, during 2008, with the parties concerned and with neighbouring States. In this connection, he will continue to meet with the Government of Morocco, the leadership of the Constitutive Congress of the Frente Popular para la Liberación of Saguia el-Hamra y del Río de Oro, known as the Frente POLISARIO, and with the Governments of the two neighbouring States, Algeria and Mauritania.

43. In carrying out his mandate, the Personal Envoy reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. In support of his mandate, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat closely coordinate policy initiatives, provide guidance and periodic updates on political developments in the region and on the situation on the ground, as well as other political analyses and advice. The Department of Field Support of the Secretariat provides logistical support during visits of the Personal Envoy to the Western Saharan region.

44. The objective, accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Personal Envoy are presented below.

Objective: To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara.

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
Progress towards the comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara	The parties participate in, and contribute fruitfully to, the negotiations towards the settlement of the question
	Performance measures
	(i) Number of meetings between the parties to resolve the impasse
	2006: 0
	Estimate 2007: 4
	Target 2008: 7
	(ii) Agreement reached or not reached
	2006: No
	Estimate 2007: No
	Target 2008: Yes

Outputs

- Discussions and consultations between the parties concerned, and political consultations with the parties, with neighbouring States and with the international community
- Reports to and briefings of the Security Council

External factors

45. The efforts, under the good offices role of the Secretary-General carried out largely through his Personal Envoy, are expected to achieve their objective provided that the two parties are willing and committed to reaching a political solution and that the neighbouring States and the international community provide support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2006-31 December 2007 variance			*Requirements for 2008*		*Variance analysis 2007-2008*	
Category of expenditure	*Appropriations*	*Estimated expenditures*	*Savings (deficit)*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Total requirements 2007*	*Variance*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)=(1)-(2)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)=(4)-(6)*
Civilian personnel costs	197.3	155.1	42.2	139.1	—	97.7	41.4
Operational costs	438.4	468.1	(29.7)	728.3	—	255.1	473.2
Total requirements	**635.7**	**623.2**	**12.5**	**867.4**	**—**	**352.8**	**514.6**

46. The estimated resource requirements in 2008 for the Personal Envoy amount to $867,400 net ($916,500 gross) and would comprise international staff costs ($139,100), provisions for consultants ($104,200), official travel ($472,000) as well as communications costs and costs for other supplies, services and equipment ($151,600).

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above								*General Service and related category*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field/ Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Grand total***
Approved 2007	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Proposed 2008	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

47. The total staffing requirements for the Office of the Personal Envoy for 2008 will remain unchanged.

5. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

($931,000)

Background, mandate and objective

48. On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had decided to appoint Terje Roed-Larsen as his Special Envoy for the implementation of Council resolution 1559 (2004) in order to enable him to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the resolution, as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In carrying out this mandate, the Special Envoy consults with the Government of Lebanon and other interested Member States to assist the

Secretary-General in the preparation of semi-annual reports to the Council on the implementation of the resolution.

49. On 17 May 2006, in reaction to the third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General (see S/2006/248), the Security Council adopted its resolution 1680 (2006), in which it reiterated its call for the full implementation of the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed and to establish full diplomatic relations and representation, noting that such measures would constitute a significant step towards asserting Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and improving the relations between the two countries, thus contributing positively to stability in the region, and urged both parties to make efforts through further bilateral dialogue to that end. These provisions of resolution 1680 (2006) have not yet been implemented.

50. In July 2006, in view of the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and Israel, the Special Envoy visited the Middle East twice, as part of the Secretary-General's efforts to secure a sustainable ceasefire in the region. Furthermore, the Security Council adopted its resolution 1701 (2006), in which it emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords; requested the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and delineation of the international borders of Lebanon; and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and subsequently on a regular basis.

51. Since the adoption of resolution 1559 (2004) on 2 September 2004, the parties concerned have made progress towards its implementation. In particular, the requirements concerning the withdrawal of Syrian troops and military assets, as well as the conduct of free and credible legislative elections, have been met. However, the provision calling for the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory and the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government has not yet been fully implemented. Moreover, the provision calling for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias has not been implemented, nor has there been a free and fair presidential election process in Lebanon, as underlined by the Security Council in the resolution and in several subsequent presidential statements.

52. Since November 2006, Lebanon has undergone a prolonged political crisis, which has slowed down further progress on the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). In this connection, in his fifth semi-annual report (S/2007/262), the Secretary-General noted that the current crisis illustrates that the provisions of the resolution remain as relevant as they were when it was first adopted. In subsequent statements of its President, the Security Council continued to call for the full implementation of its resolution 1559 (2004) and for the Secretary-General and his

Special Envoy to continue their efforts to that end. A solution to the current crisis will have to encompass discussion of and agreement on the issue of the Lebanese presidency, which is essential to achieve progress. However, neither the current political crisis in Lebanon nor the overall implementation of all provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) are purely domestic matters, as they remain linked to the broader regional trends and concerns.

53. The Special Envoy works closely with the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, who informs the Special Envoy on a regular basis about political developments in Lebanon and carries out ad hoc political missions on the ground with the Special Envoy. Furthermore, the Special Coordinator, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process provide logistical support for the trips of the Special Envoy to the Middle East.

54. The mandate of the Special Envoy will be deemed completed when the Security Council certifies that its resolution 1559 (2004) has been fully implemented. However, to date, the volatile situation in Lebanon and in the region has made the accomplishment of further progress towards the full implementation of the remaining provisions of the resolution more complex.

55. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Office of the Special Envoy are presented below.

Objective: To implement fully Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) and all subsequent related decisions of the Council, in particular resolution 1680 (2006) and the relevant provisions of resolution 1701 (2006).

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
(a) Facilitation of strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout its territory	(a) (i) Encouragement by the Special Envoy for increased efforts towards the establishment of mutual diplomatic relations between Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006); related statements of the President of the Security Council; and the delineation of the international boundaries of Lebanon with those Member States, bearing in mind that the establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent *Performance measures* Number of interactions with relevant parties 2006: 20

	Estimate 2007: 20-30 Target 2008: 30-35 (ii) Facilitation of increased extension of authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanese territory, in particular along its borders *Performance measures* Number of interactions with relevant parties 2006: 20 Estimate 2007: 20-30 Target 2008: 30-35 (iii) Support by the Special Envoy for the cessation of the illegal flow of weaponry to Lebanon *Performance measures* Number of interactions with relevant parties 2006: 20 Estimate 2007: 20-30 Target 2008: 30-35
(b) Facilitation of the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias	(b) (i) Increased accession by the Government of Lebanon to the right to exert the monopoly on the use of force throughout its territory *Performance measures* Number of interactions with relevant parties 2006: 20 Estimate 2007: 20-30 Target 2008: 30-35 (ii) Support by the Special Envoy for a reduction in the number of groups other than the official armed forces carrying arms

	Performance measures Number of interactions with relevant parties 2006: 20 Estimate 2007: 20-30 Target 2008: 30-35 (iii) Support by the Special Envoy for a reduction in the number of militia or other armed groups operating in Lebanon *Performance measures* Number of interactions with relevant parties 2006: 20 Estimate 2007: 20-30 Target 2008: 30-35
(c) Facilitation in support of a strengthened response by all relevant Governments to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1680 (2006)	(c) (i) Encouragement by the Special Envoy for increased efforts by the Governments of Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006); and related statements of the President of the Council to engage in regular bilateral dialogue, including enhanced bilateral relations, bearing in mind that the establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent *Performance measures* Number of interactions with relevant parties 2006: 20 Target 2007: 20-30 Estimate 2008: 30-35

	(ii) Encouragement by the Special Envoy for increased efforts to encourage the establishment of full diplomatic relations and representation between the Governments of Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006); and related statements of the President of the Council
	Performance measures
	Number of interactions with relevant parties
	2006: 20
	Target 2007: 20-30
	Estimate 2008: 30-35

Outputs

- Regular meetings of the Special Envoy with representatives of the Government of Lebanon and other interested Governments
- Support to the Government of Lebanon in the implementation of the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular through good offices
- Support to the Lebanese national dialogue related to the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese militias, in particular through meetings with the Government of Lebanon
- Facilitation of dialogue between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority and the Government of Lebanon on the disbanding and disarmament of Palestinian militias, in particular through meetings with the PLO/Palestinian Authority and good offices between the PLO and the Government of Lebanon
- Good offices and consultations with all foreign Governments that might have influence on the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon to assist in implementing the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions in a peaceful manner
- Good offices and consultations with the Governments of Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and related statements of the President of the Council
- Good offices and facilitation of bilateral and multilateral dialogue between Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and related statements of the President of the Council
- Regularization and clarification of Lebanon's borders
- Semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

External factors

56. The objective and expected accomplishments are expected to be achieved on the assumption that: (a) there is political stability and security in Lebanon; (b) hostilities in the region are not resumed; (c) there is political goodwill on the part of the parties concerned; (d) there is a positive influence on the parties concerned of the political goodwill of Member States; and (e) there are no tensions between Lebanon and its neighbours.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2006-31 December 2007 variance			*Requirements for 2008*		*Variance analysis 2007-2008*	
Category of expenditure	*Appropriations*	*Estimated expenditures*	*Savings (deficit)*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Total requirements 2007*	*Variance*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3) = (1)-(2)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)=(4)-(6)*
Civilian personnel costs	443.2	379.5	63.7	242.8	—	246.5	(3.7)
Operational costs	1 311.6	755.8	555.8	688.2	—	845.2	(157.0)
Total requirements	**1 754.8**	**1 135.3**	**619.5**	**931.0**	**—**	**1 091.7**	**(160.7)**

57. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2008 amount to $931,000 net ($971,800 gross) and would comprise international staff costs ($242,800), consultancy services ($71,500), travel costs ($511,200), requirements for ground transportation ($33,000), communications ($37,800) and other supplies, services and equipment ($34,700).

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related category*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field/ Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Grand total***
Approved 2007	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**1**	—	1	2	—	—	—	**2**
Proposed 2008	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**1**	—	1	2	—	—	—	**2**
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

58. The total staffing requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2008 will remain unchanged.

6. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

($7,159,100)

Background, mandate and objective

59. The situation in southern Lebanon after the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces in May 2000 was characterized by a high degree of political instability and the risk of continued conflict between Israel and Lebanon. For this reason, it was decided that there should be a United Nations political presence in Beirut to lend support to international efforts to maintain peace and security in southern Lebanon. Accordingly, the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon was established in August 2000.

60. Beginning in 2004, Lebanon experienced several dramatic political changes. As a result, there has been a deeper and broader United Nations involvement with regard to the political situation. Accordingly, in October 2005, the Secretary-General decided to expand the mandate of the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon. With this mandate enhancement, the Office was then responsible for the coordination of all political and politically related United Nations activities in Lebanon. It thus served as the lead political office for Lebanon while maintaining its peace and security mandate for southern Lebanon.

61. The military conflict between Lebanon and Israel in July 2006 had dramatic repercussions for the political and socio-economic situation in Lebanon. In the wake of the war, the country entered into a phase of ongoing political crises, security incidents and general instability, which continues to deteriorate further. The repercussions of the conflict have also presented Lebanon with even larger financial, development and socio-economic challenges. The level of political involvement and support of the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon to overall peace and stability in Lebanon continued to expand both during the conflict and in the period following it. During the conflict, the Office played a key role in working with the Government of Lebanon, the relevant Lebanese political parties and the international diplomatic community in formulating a political framework that would allow an end to hostilities and positively shape the post-conflict environment in a manner that would sustain a cessation of hostilities and, ultimately, a permanent ceasefire.

62. Political events and developments in Lebanon have led to a deeper and broader United Nations involvement in that country. The number of the Organization's activities in Lebanon has increased over the past years and require even greater information-sharing and coordination within the United Nations system. In order to achieve this important objective and to strengthen the Organization's ability to deliver coordinated and effective support across the broad spectrum of its expertise, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council in his letter dated 13 February 2007 (S/2007/85) of his intention to appoint his Personal Representative for Lebanon as the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, who will coordinate the work of the United Nations in Lebanon and represent the Secretary-General in all political aspects of the Organization's work in the country, as well as ensure that the activities of the United Nations country team in Lebanon are well coordinated with the Government of Lebanon, donors and international financial institutions in line with the overall objectives of the United Nations in Lebanon. The Council, in the

letter of its President dated 13 February 2007 (S/2007/86), took note of the intention of the Secretary-General.

63. The Special Coordinator for Lebanon will be the senior United Nations official responsible for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). In fulfilling the new and increased responsibilities, the Special Coordinator will serve as the Secretary-General's representative when interacting with the Government of Lebanon, all political parties and the diplomatic community based in Lebanon, coordinate the activities of the United Nations country team with the Government of Lebanon, the international donor community and international financial institutions in line with the overall objectives of the United Nations in Lebanon, with a particular emphasis on reconstruction, development and reform). The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon will provide political guidance to the country team and the Political Affairs Office of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), institutionalize close working relationships and create increasingly systematic mechanisms that enable regular consultations, information-sharing and greater coordination and complementarity among the Organization's various activities. As the Secretary-General's representative to the core group of countries supporting Lebanon's financial and socio-economic development, the Special Coordinator will also play a key role in advocating for continued international donor assistance to Lebanon.

64. Since its establishment, the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon (and now the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon) has played a key role in working with all concerned parties to support efforts to defuse tensions both within the national Lebanese political environment and across the Blue Line through constant analysis, reporting and preventive diplomatic action. In southern Lebanon, this action has been taken in a concerted effort with UNIFIL. The political efforts of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon have increased during the last few months of 2007 in the light of an increasingly more complex political and security environment, which has also witnessed a direct attack on UNIFIL and a growing number of security incidents, such as the small-scale conflict in the Palestinian camp of Nahr el Bared near Tripoli, assassinations in Beirut and a car bombing campaign aimed at further destabilizing the already precarious political environment.

65. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, in close coordination with the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations prepares draft reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), works closely with the Department of Political Affairs on the production of analytical papers, briefing notes and talking points for the Secretary-General's meetings with interlocutors on the situation in Lebanon and specific issues relating to the mandate of the Office. The Special Coordinator for Lebanon maintains a constant dialogue with the Under-Secretaries-General for Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations on all key political and organizational issues relating to Lebanon, while the Department of Field Support provides administrative and logistical support to the Office.

66. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon continued to achieve progress in 2007 by way of maintaining a political dialogue with the various Lebanese parties and lending diplomatic support to the peaceful resolution

of their internal disputes. By the same token, it continued to work with Lebanon and Israel in seeking to maintain calm along the Blue Line and to prevent violations from either side, but the vastly complicated task of reaching national consensus on key issues and significantly increased mistrust between the parties created an additional socio-economic challenge for the country to address. Sectarian tensions, assassinations and a general deterioration in the security climate have also posed great obstacles to achieving the main objectives of the mission.

67. The general political and security situation in Beirut has experienced a general deterioration throughout 2007. The situation along the Blue Line in southern Lebanon has continued to remain tense, with the possibility that further serious violations of the cessation of hostilities may occur.

68. With regard to the internal political situation in Lebanon, the need for a continued United Nations political presence in Beirut remains valid in order to lend support to Lebanese and international efforts to resolve political differences peacefully. Such United Nations support will remain of crucial importance and would result in progress on key constitutional issues, national consensus on presidential and parliamentary elections and an effective national dialogue on pivotal issues of national concern.

69. Political and diplomatic United Nations support will remain necessary until such time as Lebanese parties are able to interact exclusively by means of a political process of dialogue and compromise through State institutions and to work with Lebanon, Israel and important regional States in order to move from the cessation of hostilities that prevails in southern Lebanon towards a more sustainable ceasefire and eventually an armistice agreement envisaged to provide stability and security in southern Lebanon. In this regard, successful conclusions to the central political questions of a prisoner exchange between Lebanon and Israel, a resolution of the Shebaa farms issue, the cessation of Israeli overflights, full Lebanese control over the country's borders and the full resolution of the issue of armed groups in Lebanon will signify a Lebanese political landscape in which a United Nations political presence may be reduced or phased out as progress is achieved.

70. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon are presented below.

Objective: To achieve political stability and enhanced development outcomes in Lebanon and the maintenance of international peace and security in southern Lebanon.

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
(a) Sustained political dialogue among Lebanese parties on key issues	(a) (i) Continued participation of relevant parties and communities in the political process *Performance measures* 2006: Not applicable Estimate 2007: Holding of presidential elections

Target 2008: Normal functioning of State institutions, Presidency and Government operate with uncontested legitimacy, regular parliamentary meetings

(ii) Increased number of meetings and interactions among leaders of political parties represented in Parliament

Performance measures

2006: 10

Estimate 2007: 15

Target 2008: 25

(iii) Normalization of political dialogue within Lebanese political institutions

Performance measures

2006: Not applicable

Estimate 2007: Parliament meeting to ensure presidential elections

Target 2008: Cabinet political and reform agenda is gradually implemented

Outputs

- Daily meetings with Lebanese key leaders of Lebanese political parties
- Daily meetings at ministerial level of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the Deputy Special Coordinator for Lebanon with key government interlocutors to facilitate the implementation of the reform agenda and to coordinate humanitarian and reconstruction activities
- Biweekly meetings with religious leaders
- Provision of good offices and facilitation of dialogue among the parties
- Monthly public statements supporting political dialogue/consensus
- Weekly briefings to diplomatic delegations and Special Envoys on the political/security situation in Lebanon and reconstruction/development agenda for Lebanon
- 12 briefings to the Security Council
- Weekly inter-mission coordination between the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
(b) Respect for cessation of hostilities in southern Lebanon and concrete moves towards sustainable ceasefire within the framework of the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)	(b) (i) Increased number of diplomatic actions within Lebanon and Israel to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) *Performance measures* 2006: 10 Estimate 2007: 10 Target 2008: 14 (ii) Area south of Litani River free of weapons other than those of the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL *Performance measures* 2006: Reduced presence of unauthorized weapons Estimate 2007: No weapons on display Target 2008: No weapons on display (iii) Reduction in violations of the Blue Line by air, sea and land *Performance measures* 2006: Not applicable Estimate 2007: 150 Target 2008: 50 (iv) Determination of the territorial status of Shebaa farms *Performance measures* 2006: Not applicable Estimate 2007: Establishment of provisional delimitation of contested area Target 2008: Establishment of an institutional mechanism to negotiate and determine the status of Shebaa farms

	(v) Increased percentage of the implementation of the border assessment mission to strengthen the border regime *Performance measures* 2006: Not applicable Estimate 2007: Substantive follow-up on the border assessment mission and recommendations Target 2008: 50 per cent implementation of recommendations and full implementation of first border control project in northern Lebanon

Outputs

- Analytical reports on the political and security situation, including policy recommendations
- 12 public statements encouraging full respect for the Blue Line and implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and condemning violations of the Blue Line
- 50 policy-coordination and information-sharing meetings with UNIFIL
- 17 joint preventive diplomatic initiatives with UNIFIL
- 12 assessment visits to southern Lebanon to review the progress of reconstruction efforts, the functioning of United Nations country team coordination mechanisms and to maintain relations with local municipalities and stakeholders
- 8 missions to Israel to discuss the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and the status of Shebaa farms
- Four reports to the Security Council on implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
(c) Coordinated response to humanitarian and reconstruction needs as well as gradual implementation of the reform agenda (Paris III)	(c) (i) Improved delivery of social services *Performance measures* 2006: Successful mobilization of resources to meet humanitarian challenges ($1 billion) Estimate 2007: Availability of adequate funding for ongoing humanitarian and reconstruction needs

	Target 2008: Availability of adequate funding for ongoing humanitarian needs, the rehabilitation of Palestinian camps and the implementation of the Paris III reform agenda
	(ii) Increased number of donor coordination meetings
	Performance measures
	2006: 2
	Estimate 2007: 4
	Target 2008: 12

Outputs

- Biweekly United Nations country team/policy group/working level coordination meetings on the implementation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework
- Monthly meetings with the Government and Lebanese parties on the implementation of the reform agenda
- Monthly meetings with the donor community on the United Nations humanitarian and reconstruction efforts to advocate for continued donor involvement and to coordinate programmes and activities
- Facilitation through technical assistance of the Government's donor coordination mechanisms
- Establishment of contingency planning for emergency response (twice yearly) by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon in collaboration with the United Nations country team, the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNIFIL and the Government of Lebanon

External factors

71. The objective would be achieved on the assumption that the domestic political situation, overall security situation and regional developments will not adversely affect stability in Lebanon and along the Blue Line.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2006-31 December 2007 variance			Requirements for 2008		Variance analysis 2007-2008	
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Savings (deficit)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Total requirements 2007	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3) = (1)-(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	2 900.6	3 076.0	(175.4)	5 376.7	—	2 198.6	3 178.1
Operational costs	1 383.5	1 754.7	(371.2)	1 782.4	929.2	885.6	896.8
Total requirements	**4 284.1**	**4 830.7**	**(546.6)**	**7 159.1**	**929.2**	**3 084.2**	**4 074.9**

72. The estimated requirements for the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon for a one-year period ending 31 December 2008 amount to $7,159,100 net ($8,016,800 gross), and would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of 28 existing positions, the reclassification of one P-3 position (Administrative Officer) to the P-5 level owing to the expansion of the mission, and the security team, as well as the establishment of 52 new positions ($5,376,700), travel of staff ($118,500), the acquisition of office equipment and supplies, the rental of premises for the Office ($817,800), the acquisition and maintenance of vehicles ($550,800), costs for communications ($145,800) and information technology ($99,500), medical services ($7,600) and other services, supplies and equipment ($42,400).

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above								General Service and related category			National staff			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field/ Security Service	General Service	Total inter-national	National Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Grand total
Approved 2007	1	—	—	—	2	1	3	—	7	5	1	13	—	15	—	28
Proposed 2008	1	1	—	1	3	2	3	2	13	8	2	23	2	55	—	80
Change	—	1	—	1	1	1	—	2	6	3	1	10	2	40	—	52

73. The Special Coordinator for Lebanon is the senior-most official responsible for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) in all its elements, with the exception of the peacekeeping aspect of the resolution carried out by UNIFIL south of the Litani River. Given this responsibility, combined with the new structure of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon as a semi-integrated mission, the Special Coordinator for Lebanon is now responsible for coordinating all aspects of United Nations work in Lebanon. In order to implement this expanded mandate, the following 52 additional positions are proposed to be established:

(a) 8 substantive positions: a Deputy Special Coordinator (ASG); a Director of Political Affairs (D-1); three Political Affairs Officers (1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 National Officer); an Associate Political Affairs Officer (P-2); a Media Adviser (National Officer); and a Personal Assistant to the Deputy Special Coordinator (General Service (Other level));

(b) 5 administrative positions: a Human Resources Assistant (Field Service); two Communications and Information Technology Assistants (Field Service and Local level); and two Drivers (Local level);

(c) 39 security positions: the Head of the Close Protection Unit (P-2); a Coordination Officer (Field Service); and 37 Security Officers (Local level).

74. The Deputy Special Coordinator would act as Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, leading the United Nations country team, and manage its coordination and joint programme efforts. The position would be funded on a cost-shared basis with the United Nations Development Programme.

75. The strengthened political team to be led by a Director (D-1) would support the Special Coordinator in the political functions of the Office, including interaction with a large number of political interlocutors, and political research and analysis.

76. Based on the increased administrative responsibilities resulting from the expanded mandate, the mission's administration would be strengthened through the reclassification of the position of Administrative Officer to the P-5 level and additional staff in human resources management, and information and communications technology. The increase in security personnel reflects the requirements as recommended by the Department of Safety and Security based on the prevailing conditions in the mission area.